Iraq and the Recent Year's of Struggle
The nebulous state of conflict which suddenly appeared to infect Iraq during mid July when the assembly of militant Islamist extremists swept across the border from Syria has continued to be a frightful situation. The group referred to as ISIS, the Islamist State of Iraq and Syria, is constructed with an organization of top level members for which ultimate authority is in the hands of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a callous looking dark bearded figure whose appearance conveys that of an empowered Muslim cleric. Al-Baghdadi was once a top ranking member of Sadam Hussein’s oppressive Baath Party which for anyone who recalls the circumstances that compelled the United States to enter into the first Iraqi War in 1991 and again in 2003 was to end the torturous methods of fear inducing control that then governed the country.
Sadam flouted a secular style of rule within his Baath party that never emphasized a significant religious pretext for the nation despite Iraq having it’s overwhelming Muslim population. Such a non-politicized religious policy within the government for example contrasts with a country like Saudi Arabia(Sunni-led) or Iran(Shiite-led) where the order of the state is centered upon the respective Muslim beliefs.
For the Iraqi people, the division between the two most fundamentally different systems of Islam, that of Shiite and Sunnism, has long provoked a dichotomous existence between the primary sects of the population. The non reconciliatory nature between the groups can be most attributable not so much to any major differences in their tenants of belief although some do exist, but more to do with the long history of unequal treatment shown to one group over the other based upon whom has held political power. For the preponderance of time within Iraq’s recent history for which the dictatorship of Sadam ruled, the Sunni’s were provided a more favorable governing policy. Cruel treatment among much of the nation at the hands of the state police affected Sunnis too, but particularly it was the Shiites who were subjected to the intolerable conditions that prevailed through the 23 years of the Sadam rule.
This inequality continues to resonate a severe mistrust for one group over the other in the aftermath of the recent American overthrow in 2004. Shortly there after, the animosity only worsened as sectarian violence erupted with each group aspiring to grab a predominate portion of control over the nation. With a competing landscape for either group to seize a leading position and much disillusionment over an occupying nation trying to assert it’s influence into the process provoked greater animosity between many within the hard-lined Sunni and Shiite communities.
Sadam himself was Sunni and much of the favoritism shown towards this thirty-five percent minority segment of the population left the Shiites who hold a 55% majority, unjustly represented and under stricter control in order to quell oppositional uprising.
Thus the overthrow of the Baath state actuated what nearly all Shiites as well as many Sunni’s had long desired, the opportunity for a justly managed political state that could utilize the national resources and provide for adequate standards for the country’s thirty-six million people. This envisioned optimism followed that an inclusive government might be formed to provide representational politics between the two faiths in addition with the other minority groups including Christians and Kurds. But despite efforts in rebuilding a transparent government capable of wielding authority fairly and promoting cooperation between the leaders of the disparate factions of society has largely failed to transpire.
The third largest of the nation’s ethnic groups, the Kurds, are a people who have for centuries struggled to find an autonomous homeland and have been forced to scatter themselves among the borders of Turkey, Syria, Iran and Iraq often confronting intolerance by these various political states. The northern territory in Iraq that they occupy encompasses nearly fifteen thousand square miles and their more recent efforts to create an unmolested territorial zone has been one of the few positive aspects that seem to have taken place since the American led invasion.
For the last seven years, this northern Iraqi Kurdish region has managed to flourish as it’s people have utilized the benefits of billions of dollars in US funding for revitalizing the land and developing modernity within the community. Many of Iraq’s oil fields are located in this northern part of the country as well as in the south, below the capital of Bagdad and towards Kuwait. This southern region, where major holy cities of Fallajuh, Basra and Najaf are located, is comprised mostly of Shiites and became a place of much contention for several years during the American occupation.
All throughout much of the nation though during the time of U.S. occupation, the sectarian violence ferociously mounted as several of the ideological extremist clerics like that of the Shiite Moktada al-Sadr in the south battled against any perceived opposition. Particularly these extremist militias continued the fight to rid Iraq of foreign intervention which they deem as an imposition of infidel, western ideals that conspires to weaken the Islamic importance and ultimately cede power to their most loathed enemy, that of Israel.
As Iraq continued to be absorbed in a state of deadly conflict beginning in 2004 then reaching it‘s worst point between 2007-’09, the sensibilities among much of the nation being at odds with one another escalated. In summary this was a result of the two aforementioned reasons that include the competing mistrust of aspiring Sunni/Shiite power holders, the motivation of religious fundamentalists whose intent was to prevent the imposition of external policies and thirdly the sudden incursion of regional extremist al-Qaeda fighters who used the opportunity of infiltrating Iraq to provoke more chaos in it’s attack against the West.
That of which first compelled our nation to become involved in this dangerous conflagration, parallels that of how the United States became involved in Afghanistan eighteen months before. The ambitious policies of national defense following the tragedy of 9/11 were that the United States would persistently strive to rid the western world against enemy terrorists. Identifying these threats and their geographies beckoned attention primarily to the Middle East which cast a spotlight upon Iraq as a potential enemy sponsoring nation. A simplified timeline of what soon followed beginning in the early part of 2003 involves the Bush Administration’s response to suspicions that Sadam was in possession of nuclear weapons. This speculation instigated a month long period of tense dialogue between various nations on how a large western alliance of nations might come to cope with a seemingly uncooperative Iraq over the issue of weapons of mass destruction. A decision finally came on March 17th when then President Bush decided to enact a unilateral effort for invading Iraq.
The expectations for those who supported the war effort was premised upon engaging in quick strike tactics that our military has shown great proficiency in and then playing the part of a sidelined diplomatic advisor to help the Iraqis form a new government. It soon came to be found though that a decisive victory against the looming perils of a bomb ridden nation partly destroyed by the American and British military attacks was inconceivable without major direct efforts in implementing national government change.
Soon did the efforts in eliminating the egregiousness of Sadam’s dictatorial regime create the gaping power vacuum that soon incubated the chaos that would prevail for the next decade during the US occupation. The current aftermath of the United States intervening was a result that hardly any Western military advisor would have anticipated. The need for a prolonged engagement in the war effort as the nation cataclysized deeper into chaos strained immense resources to a degree which no-one would likely have ever imagined.
Throughout the eight year campaign, the US grew exceedingly weary emotionally, sentimentally, financially and personally as daily reports were released in national newspapers of new casualties being inflicted by an unidentifiable mix of enemies, seasoned in unconventional tactics of suicide attacks and roadside IEDs. At the same time, the effort in Afghanistan to drive out the enclave of al-Qaeda terrorist groups likewise extended far beyond the time period that many would have expected, acerbating even more the disgust felt by civilians at home and the thousands of Americans soldiers who were repeatedly being sent to either of the two battlegrounds on return tours of military duty.
As for the despairingly challenging efforts of constructing a political agenda in Iraq during the years of war, the US helped install national elections for the people to choose who they felt might be the most capable of candidates to serve as prime minister. Who would lead the country forward amidst strenuous sectarian violence and uncertainty for how a post Sadam government might effect the national rehabilitation in the midst of much unsettled atrocity was a crucial situation which the United States would help to determine.
The United States in 2006, after several interim ministers had been in office, claimed that the ultimate decision would be left to the nation’s citizens to choose but not first without a selection process by which the US could screen likely candidates. This ultimately brought about the election of Nuri al Maliki in 2007 who had long been a Shiite exile fighting against Sadam’s government from inside of Iran while also having possessed a worldliness as having received degrees from London. You may gain a detailed understanding about the eight years of political effort that have occurred since Nuri al Maliki came into power in 2007, from this article.
His rule while showing effectiveness in improving security over the last several years despite a resurgent spike in the level of militant violence during 2010-11 before the complete withdrawal of American forces in January of 2012 has been riddled with controversy. The hatred for which most of the Sunni population feels for Maliki has continued to place a chasm between the two main sects of the country’s population. The recent 2014 election which was to either position Maliki to a third appointment in office or offer an opportunity to fill the position with a new leader, whom the Sunni’s hoped might be of their same religious affiliation or at least someone with more inclusiveness towards the country’s leading minority loomed undecided for a month. Once the results were officially tabulated in May more unsettled sentiment had provoked between those of the Iraqi population who have long felt victimized by the tactics of Maliki’s policy.
Many contend that Maliki has held the Sunni population to blame for Iraq‘s troubles. He’s been accused of exerting targeted punishment against Sunnis whom he deems as more likely to be potential terrorists threats. This has fostered the notion of many Sunnis that the administration is bent upon punishing the nation’s minority as retribution for what once was once a repressive subjection of the Shiite population during the reign of Sadam.
As the country awaited this year's electoral results, significant calls for boycott against the Maliki administration were made and an escalation of turmoil transpired under uncertainty of the new ruler. This environment of hoped for transition in central leadership fostered a state of weakness which afforded the long awaited scheming efforts of the ISIS militia to surmount a blitzkrieg assault upon parts of western Iraq along the porous borders with Syria before penetrating deeper within the wary nation.
more to come on the incursion of ISIS and the US response...
