A Modern Glimpse at a Hard to Unravel Nation

June 20, 2013

So just how might one view the results of the Iranian presidential elections that resulted in a solid win for the moderate Hassan Rowahni? It appears to be nothing short of a tremendous encouragement for the future on hopes that the country can move beyond the despairing conditions of a weakened economy and tense relations with western nations. The population has unfortunately been stymied for decades due to limiting factors of hope as the nation has been under varying degrees of government restrictions, sour international relations, human rights abuses and debilitating economic effects partly from the ongoing sanctions enacted by Europe and the US a year ago.

For a country of nearly seventy million whose progress towards modernization since the early twentieth century have faced countless impediments, is surely deserving of an opportunity to utilize it’s resources and work toward a more amenable standard of living. Much of the setbacks for the people of whom many are highly educated and capable of success is a result of ongoing incidents of the country’s own internal strife and symptomatic of the frequent power struggles and inconsistencies of rule. It’s not a plaguing situation of ethnic tension or widespread civilian dissent that has hampered Iran as is seen in many other troubled nations, which may signal opportunity in the midst of the latest election. To get a feel of what’s occurred in this highly talked about nation over the last fifty years, here’s a historical summary.

In 1906, the nation made it’s first attempt at a democratic government with the overturning of the Qajari Dynasty which was officially the last of many centuries of ruling dynasties. These centralized rulerships operated from the city centers of Tehran or Fars, serving mainly as bastions of power over the tiny percentage of wealthy land owners, middle class bazaar merchants and the overwhelmingly large numbers of peasant land dwellers who lived rurally. The country’s urban areas have long been located in the capital of Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan, Fars, and Qom, the nation’s holy city.

The importance of Islam in life has always been widely observed and disseminated from the religious Ulema, a kind of priesthood of Islamic theology. The strong belief in the Shiite faction of Islam takes precedence in all matters of life for these religious scholars who are viewed by much of the worldwide Shia Muslim community as being the epicenter of theological truth and reason. The Shiites differ in their belief from the more populous Sunni over the lineage of the holy descendants who came after the seventh century Prophet Muhammad. The Shiite religious view in addition to the central importance on the Koran is the belief that the prophet’s son in law, Ali, established a succession of holy descendants known as the twelve imams each of whom held a sacred importance in the development of the religion. The final and twelfth imam they contend is yet to have arrived but shall in righteous order descend to earth and provide testament along with holy retribution upon the Muslim world.

The long history and importance of the Ulema clerics in what was once commonly referred to as the Persian Empire wove their theology into the existence of the state for more than a thousand years often with close cooperation from ruling families of the state. The longstanding presence of the Shiite Ulema was an early continuation of the Persian tradition of a holy priesthood which had existed prior to the pan Arabization movement that spread across much of the Arab and Middle Eastern land since before the turn of the first millennia. There was not a particularly welcoming sentiment among many of the Ulema and leaders of Persia at the time for the fervent spread of Muhammad’s word because of the preexisting centuries old belief in the monotheistic Mazdaen religion.

 

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Thus some hostilities ensued against what the Ulema perceived to be a disruptive proselytizing force of the neighboring Arab population making their way to counter the rather established Middle Aged society in Persia. But the adoption of the Muslim religious importance for the Shiite faithful did nonetheless eventually take strong form albeit seemingly in a different tradition from that of the Sunnis in the Arabian Peninsula. Today several holy sights exist of major importance to the Shiite religion, with the most important being located in Najf and Karbala in Iraq and Samarra in Iran.

Since Iran’s first push towards democracy at the turn of the last century, influence from developed, outside nations had been something of an impactful force. Russia who were a major world power for much of the century prior to it’s communist collapse had significantly sought to exert its influence on Iran. In particular, their presence included military fortifications of the Soviet Cossack Brigade, stationed for decades in the northwest near the Caspian Sea along current day Azerbaijan near the town of Tabriz.

Iran’s first democratic movement helped to relinquish some of the former dynastic control in the nation, but nonetheless the title image of Shah or King persisted as the ruler in charge of running the country for many years to come. The Shah’s position and occupier changed hands several times through various successions and power coups during the twentieth centuries. Varying approaches for managing the country’s affairs resulted from the different succession of Shah’s during the last century even while power remained within the same family despite Iran’s claiming to have established a democratic constitution. A rather universal theme among the Shah family that seemed to characterize their style of rule was often an aversion to outright external influence over the ways of life for the country.

Nonetheless early in the twentieth century, a need for developing the standard of life and prosperity upon a country that was still largely rural and impoverished attempted change but experienced many decades of tepid improvement . British influence during much of the twentieth century had the first of any foreign importance with it’s imperialist policy that led to the discovery and production of Iran’s oil resources, operated in the south.

Both World Wars exerted an impact upon the global politics as allied and the aggressor nations sought a commitment from the various Middle Eastern nations to join them for logistical and empowerment reasons. As the United States, Britain, France and Russia mainly existed as allies during both of the wars, the country of Iran was not left to be bitterly ravaged between competing enemies. For a time, Iran found favor with the Germans during World War II but this dissipated. The outcome of the war consequently gave split influence for the foreign powers upon Iran’s soil with Russia exercising primary influence in the North and Great Brittan continuing to operate the Anglo Iranian Oil Company in the south.

The ration of profits over time that Iran received from the oil became a national grievance for the Shah, the prime minister and eventually the population felt deserving of more than the fractional fifteen percent of profits received. Tensions over the matter stirred and soon Iran much as it had often tended to do, sought non-interventionalist relations to make use of it’s own country’s valuable resources and leave cooperation with the international world simply at arms length transactions instead.

The United States looked to get involved in the 1950’s during it’s push for democratization of the world’s countries and we occasionally answered calls from the Iranian Shah for loans in helping to assist in it’s desperate need for road and rail infrastructure. The push for modernizing other aspects of life in both the urban and rural areas of Iran such as construction as well as education, were objectives of the governing Shah during the middle decades of the century.

Cooperation from the United States was important for some time but conditions within the nation were oftentimes perceived to be best handled internally and the outside nations left the conditions largely to handle themselves. A period of liberalism that was affecting much of the world after the nationalist pre-World War II sentiment sparked some disturbance among groups of the society. For one, a growing resentment grew among citizens over the perceived unfairness of treatment by the Shah. Resentment began to be voiced by the newly educated class about continued languishing conditions of an old world type of country that was not being properly governed.

The Tudeh, a communist party emerged in the early sixties that resonated with a large portion of the young population. Many of the emerging activists were recent graduates of the newly opened Teheran Universities. Their political sympathies were in accordance with Marxist doctrine. This groups movement for national reform didn’t conform entirely to the Soviet Stalinist mantra of rule. Rather a milder call to reform which might lead to effective change by taking land from the minor consortium of wealthy land owners and redistributing it to the immense peasant population was one aim of these young intellectuals. A series of land reforms thus were enacted that to some extent achieved these aims. Meanwhile much greater urbanization was taking place as the capital experienced high growth rates and national birth rates climbed as well. The National Alliance party largely countered the aforementioned Tudeh and wielded a strong support among many of the countries people as well.

This notion of an advanced practical minded populace was proving to be of strong character for many of the people of the nation in the second half of the twentieth century amidst a range of differing sociological ideologies. The liberal form was nonetheless powerful and important in influencing a system of life that would ensure forward progress for the nation irrespective of which side of the political debate one found themselves on.

The realistic pursuit of a democratic way of life that many people in Iran sought was something that wasn’t to have taken such a tenacious form for many of the other Middle Eastern or Arab countries. It can be seen rather that the liberal and secular policies of Turkey and it’s modern founder Kemal Ataturk could be seen as resembling the course that Iran hoped to achieve.

An old yet important class of people who had long represented the urban center of life in Iran were the merchants known as the bazarri who had been the crux of facilitating commerce in the massive markets. The immense locations were they operated were always a central part of life for patrons and vendors to exchange many of the country’s non petroleum goods. This included the sale of nearly all of the domestically produced goods, textiles and food but also included the sale of imported merchandise as well.

The vendors historically had paid rents to the Islamic clerics who owned much of the property where these marketplaces were located. So in addition to the devout religious beliefs that most of the merchants historically adhered to, the financial commitment provided to the religious clerics equated to a special loyalty of the Bazarri to the holy Islamic property owners. Thus whenever conditions within the population erupted, mostly with the dissent opposing the Shah’s insufferable treatment of the population in the midst of mass poverty, the Ulema clerics nonetheless garnered the utmost allegiance from the merchant middle class.

Relations among the Shah and the Islamic Ulema long had been a central, coordinated aspect of Iranian life and politics. For periods of recent and older history, seldom disagreement over the nature of religion in matters of the state and the general handling of politics were at odds between one another. It was not until the onset of the late nineteen seventies that conditions of these two entities reached a head in the most severe contest of power and theocratic controversy which the country has ever seen in modern times.

These years prior to the onset of the revolution, cities often captured the interests and ideas of many members within urban society. Many of the progressive city residents saw themselves as Islamic by birth but secular in daily life with a pressing agenda for bettering the conditions that could be had for it’s proud country.

Normally several Ayatollah or religious supreme leaders would command the ever important Shiite Muslim agendas such as being the religious face for the nation in coordinating relations with the Shah as well as conducting religious matters among neighboring Shiite populations like Iraq, Bahrain and other areas.

The popular observance of the Shiite indoctrination though could be viewed as milder than that of several of the other religious states such as Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Iraq, and some populations of neighboring Afghanistan and Pakistan to the east. The importance of Shiite belief has long since been among the a fundamental purpose for most Iranians. However, tolerance for other religious worship has overtime been permitted as the clerics have accepted freedom of worship for other Muslim, Christian, or even Jewish faith in accordance to what the Koran refers to as “people of the book.“ But importantly a special secular and intellectual proficiency has for centuries existed that held great prestige in works of poetry, folklore and mystic tradition that is uniquely Persian. The emphasis over many centuries on this distinct culture often has been a central theme for the ruling dynasties and passed on triumphantly for generations.

The growth of the cities and rates of population increase after the first half of the 20th century prompted a dramatic impact on the demographics of the country, making for the spreading of various viewpoints on political thought and the status quo unfamiliarly different than before. Even prior to the onset of democratization, a cautiousness between the ruling Shah and the religious powers often provoked tension as to the institutionalizing of faith and the manner in which politics were decided. But an appreciation for the long history in Persia that evolved even since before the time of the Greek Empire have often given all members of society something to hold as a meaningful solidarity. For example, the insistence of the country maintaining it’s Persian, Farsi language by discouraging the adaptation of Arabic during the centuries of Pan Arabization is but one important example of preserving the unique traditional standard for the country.

Some of the country’s most creative forms of expression ascended to greatness during several points of the twelve and fourteenth centuries by poets and writers whose works have continued to be honored.
Thus the interesting dynamic of a mighty clerical authority, the Ulema, for whom the nation has most often abided by in addition to this notion of a free thinking, enlightened perspective on life marks an interesting balance among the lives for many of the people.

In the latter decades of the twentieth century more of the liberal movement than ever before was rippling out from the west with juxtaposing ideas between communist versus capitalist democrats began reaching the forefront. Things for Iran became much more complicated. As more of the rural populace began to immigrate to the cities for education and work, they were harshly exposed to a lifestyle that caused many of them to be confused, ashamed and nervous of the progressive nature that the oil wealth and liberal mind had instilled upon part of the country. Young men didn’t know how to react to the site of westerly clad women in the streets and in schools. This overtime provoked a more hard lined approach for many believers of the mojtahead religious system to seek major conservative reform.

Largely to do with the changing nature too was Shah’s reign into the 1960s that had wielded an authority that was in little ways beneficial to bolstering prosperity for much of the country. He conducted a personal, lavish lifestyle greatly at odds with the conditions experienced by the rest of the people. This unjust disparity only grew worse as more of the emerging intelligentsia of the recently educated Tehran Universities grew ever more suspect of the countries’ leaders. The challenges to political authority grew stronger and the rapid pace of urban and population growth was making major shifts in the perception of the country coupled with external influences that had become more privy to the Iranian way of life. By the mid 1970’s significant problems were becoming unmanageable and myriad issues would unfold to wreak a frightening situation in the country.

As a general matter of speaking, the liberalization movement that ensued from the urban educated and proponents of the land reform movement had a large appeal nationally. In 1964 the land reform was coined the White Revolution and made some progress to deal with the unjust rift between the elite ownership and servitude population. During this time Pahlavi Shah was in power after being handed the title through family succession and he carefully was acquiescing to the sympathies being voiced by the people. Tendencies of the country going in a modern developed, direction like that of France or Germany, of whom Iran had relied on for foreign trade became favorable among the Shah and much of the reformist population movement early on.

Trade, industrialization, construction, development, and all of the basic elements needed to transform a nation from an antiquated model of civilization into a competitive, thriving entity seemed to be slowly coming into place. The city of Isfahan for example had once been an homage to tranquil, sanctimony located along a plateau with picturesque water falls and meditational surroundings. It soon though was welcome to factories that experienced a large rural migration of uneducated, peasant job seekers.

With these rapid patterns of development, trade relations were becoming more open with the major European countries. A variety of products including oil were leaving the country in large numbers. Outsourced production for many material goods with factories of international companies such as Bell Labs, Dupont and the German Krupp Corporation stimulated the economy. Domestic automobiles at plants in Tehran were becoming a popular business. But one nonetheless that showed a lack of self dependence as the process involved importing various parts from foreign suppliers before finalizing the assembly of these finished Kohdro brand of vehicles.

Small consumer items still maintained a market with the traditional urban center bazaaris and continued to be sold through this age old system of exchange. The boost in commerce was a windfall for many of these bizarre middle class salesmen. At issue however was a breach from their traditional affinity in religious ways and the obedience that this sector of the population had traditionally shown. The sudden financial gain had begun to cloud the hard lined religious views for many.

The economy’s pace instigated a surge in inflation, that severely weakened the value of the Iranian riel, as prices became much higher for nearly all goods. The Bazaar merchants though were still able to capitalize on the increase in prices as their profits outpaced any slowdown in sales. The greater wealth among them, psychologically altered their perceived place among the newly emerging urban society around them. The bazaar continued to view themselves as a major force in the commercial sector of society and to a large extent they still were. But their sympathies were growing more moderate in association with the tide of liberal sentiment that had been unfolding alongside them for the previous decades.

The Ulema clergy, took measures on occasion to crack down on the steep profits that the merchants were making by setting price ceilings on exchanges. The Shah implemented price setting controls as well, breeding further tension between a once long standing cozy relation among the old fashioned urban proprietors and the country’s religious and political leaders.

The educational development that had long been a priority of needed improvement in the eyes of the liberals since the early twentieth century witnessed some of the greatest progress. However coeducation among boys and girls became standard in primary, secondary and university systems which was an alarming change from the system decades earlier.

The reformist policies of the Shah discouraged wearing of the veil in the attempt to promote the idea of secularism and thus the preference of western apparel rapidly took hold for both men and women. Other forms of western influence such as cinema and popular trends were becoming more common through the sixties and seventies.

For traditionally minded people, particularly those who had moved into the city for the primary purpose of attending school were confronted with the shock factor of a way of life that was an antithesis to which they had grown up to believe as rural Shiite Muslims.

The religious elite who had long been friendly towards the ways of the people and supportive of popular tendencies as long as it wasn’t an affront to a principled Islamic way, perceived these major changes as becoming morally apprehensible. The Shah himself though wasn’t entirely opposed and sought no concerted position to repeal or to quell the transformation taking place. For one, the changes exhibited the consequential push of the modern, prosperous society. The country’s position had made remarkable improvements in the eyes of modernists and the freedom of thought while shocking for some was nonetheless that which was to be had from several decades of national growth. The Shah could tolerate life as it had become as long as his position of power wasn’t directly being put at odds.

The National Alliance Party members caused regular episodes of strife with their agenda based largely on enactment of a legitimate constitutional form of government. Demonstrations would result between them and the Marxist Tudeh party members but little yet had surfaced by the early to mid seventies to an extent that necessitated an extreme response of suppression by the Shah‘s military. Conditions though by the mid 1970’s heightened tension among several of the ayatollah religious leaders who condescended how society was unfolding.

More outspoken and political differences between the communist and democratic supporters as well as the dissenting religious faction began further antagonizing what had come to be seen as a rather monarchial style of rule from the Shah’s house of power. Even though the Shah vested some power with the Prime Minister and the parliamentary group known as the Majle, too much power was though to be held by the county‘s leader. Forces of dissent were becoming very strong as a tipping point and ultimate wake of chaos were becoming all too immanent.

In 1975, the Ayatollah Khomeini had made a departure for the holy city of Najf where he intended to spend several months in the company of other religious Shiites in ritualistic ceremony as well as contemplating Iran’s state of affairs. His religious position for years having been at odds with the Shah over the course of society, the Ayatollah threw his support behind the strong opposition movement calling for the Shah’s abdication.

Prior to the Ayatollah’s return from Iraq, he was barred by the Shah from reentry because of his hardliner support of the opposition and thus Khomeini choose to take full time residence in Paris beginning in 1977. His group of supporters held strong and activism called for Ayatollah Khomeini’s return and the revival of the principled religious order over society. As his supporters arose with more outspoken criticism, the Ayatollah pressed for these opposition groups to continue their activism, furthering the hostilities between what once were cooperative forces between the Islamic Ulema and Iran’s political leadership. But now the escalation among the two sides was irreproachable and the followers from the groups were reacting with more forceful activism more often.

The terms sought by several of the major factions including the religious faithful and the radical adversaries to the Shah weren’t being addressed seriously enough. The latter group was dismayed mostly at the economic disparity and soon found themselves in coalition with the religious hardliners as both aimed to overturn the nation’s ruler despite their differences in the future vision for Iran. This unusual coalition of forces continued the outspoken call for a return of Khomeini for whom another religious cleric, Ayatollah Shariatamadari, had been named as his replacement.

The Prime Minister Jasmshid Amuzegar made various attempts at culling the unrest with limited success. A state of martial law in 1977 was decreed with reluctance from the Shah but was enacted upon the recommendation of the anti terrorist agency SAVAK. As calls for the Shah’s resignation ensued in public, officers of SAVAK on several occasions opened fire on the groups, resulting in dozens of deaths. The American government’s position continued to support the Shah’s rule throughout. Such a diplomatic stance led the Marxist reformist and pro Khomeini demonstrators to be increasingly more resentful of the United States.

In September 1977 the son of the exiled Khomeini, Seyyed Mustafa Khomeini, died of an apparent heart attack. However many claimed foul play was to blame for which the Shah’s movement was thought to have been responsible. Several months later, a fateful article appeared in the country’s most circulated periodical, written by an unidentified source which outspokenly criticized Khomeini and the movement that his revolutionary support was perceivably continuing to fuel. The criticism brought about in the letter intensified the call for deposing the Shah and unrest broke out in the holy city of Qom. Western businesses became targets of attack including the worst of incident where a cinema was set afire and resulted in the death of four hundred thirty people. The Prime Minister resigned shortly thereafter to be replaced by Jaffar Sharif- Emami attempting to reconcile various problems.

The Shah had for some time censored the media, forcing the closing of many newspaper offices that had grown in numbers and popularity for many years during the liberalization of Iran. Two religious camps not entirely at odds with one another but distinct in their hardliner sentiment over conditions in the country were at play. The moderates who favored the support of Ayatollah Shariatamadari who left open the possibility of negotiations between the religious power and the Shah continued to receive modest support.

The leader of the National Front Karim Sanjabi broached discussions to settle matters with the Shah but upon hearing of Sanjabi’s attempt at reconciliation, Ayatollah Khomeini said from Paris that such efforts would bar the National Front from anything to do with the opposition movement. Any noncompliance with this non conciliatory stance of the Khomeini camp would potentially jeopardize would be negotiators from receiving a future position in a new system of rule upon an overthrow.

The only foreseeable outcome that Khomeini would envision was none other than a military coup. Tensions were high enough and causalities had reached a point in the country where not too long ago, a rational, practical minded society had set an example of western encouragement but now had become marked with chaos and likely to become the result of a coordinated coup.

To be continued…


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