A Perspective on Egypt's Recent Turmoil
The major incidents of violence which lasted for several days in the major cities of Egypt began around August 14th, causing a death toll of nearly a thousand with still much continuation of unrest. The initial clashes emerged between loyal supporters of Muhammad Morsi, the recently deposed president who took office on July 1, 2012 after defeating his opponent Ahmed Shafiq. Since one year has elapsed, conditions have proven difficult for accomplishing much in the way of positive change for the future despite the absence of an autocratic government.
At the time, Morsi's political ideology seemed most attuned to the majority of the nation's overwhelming Muslim population as he championed a vision for improved socio-economic conditions and effective leadership. His opponent Shafiq, who had served under the Hosni Mubarak dictatorship as an air force commander had made many voters fearful for the fate of Egyptian politics that might result in the hands of a former regime general as the country sought a fresh start on freedom.
To understand a little of what is confronting Egypt now has something to do with understanding the ability of Mubarak to have held his long reign in power. It has been countlessly described in the media since the Arab Spring revolts began that the Mubarak style of rule consisted of a tightly enforced balancing act among top political powers, the military and the Supreme Court of Judiciary Armed Forces. In Egypt, the military accounts for about 2 million in a population of over thirty million where the armed forces remained loyal to their former dictator until the escalation of violence and protest demanding for abdication became so vociferous during the late stages of the 2011 movement. After nearly two weeks of Mubarak attempting to quiet the protestors through diplomatic assurances, international gesturing, and civil violence, the military eventually agreed to back the revolution's cause for an overthrow.
But once achieved, the state of political flux that was to follow and the lack of a subsequent time table for free elections left Egypt void of an assertive action plan for several months. Immediately following the overthrow, the military made themselves the governing power of the country along with the Supreme Court of Armed Services. Both the military and the court essentially neglected to bring about any immediate attempts for impartial political advancement as had been called for by the millions of protestors during the weeks prior to Mubarak’s forced resignation. Instead, the military moderated the state. Top commanding generals and the courts passively sought to evoke an environment of relative tranquility for the nation at the end of an exhausted movement which so many citizens had partaken in. So rather than quickly calling for a temporary, elected body to take action in matters of the country, the court and military largely operated as they had all along. Thus advanced a slow process of assuring the nation that the organizing of free elections for an interim parliament were soon to occur. But the empowered military leadership mainly adhered to their old ways of secretive, back office management for the Egyptian agenda favorable to their own interests.
For the fact that Egypt's military has always been the best compensated employment in a country where the national average of daily wages is below poverty level, an allegiance to the ways of the former regime was deeply rooted. Thus even after Mubarak’s overthrow, the loyalties weren't quick to change.
It wasn't until July 1, 2012 that the elections were scheduled and even then scrutiny over the choice of candidates was voiced by many members in society.
As previously noted, the notion of Ahmed Shafiq, a former air force commander, to have been one of the two final candidates was viewed incredulously by many who questioned his ability to unequivocally advocate for a democratic break from the past. Additionally Muhammad Morsi, a moderate career politician who had previously been affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood also encountered groups of opposition. But of Morsi's most vehement adversaries seemed to have been the still empowered members of top military and judicial courts.
Mubarak's former regime had flouted a secular style of rule that went so far as to mandate that Egypt's military organization was to officially refrain from religion affiliation, (not to say that individual soldiers couldn't adhere to personal beliefs). On the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood, being Islamist and in favor of a society predicated on tenants of religious order had been hostile to the old regime. Today, the group stands as a vastly different organization than it was upon it's inception in 1929. During the beginning and for decades to follow the group was a radical faction accustomed to violence for declaring it's own style of religious politics. Thus given it's historic reputation and the Egyptian regime's policy of eliminating any threatening opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood remained banned as an official party since 1955. But in a country where 95% of the people are some form of either liberal or conservative Muslim, the notion of religious minds operating in politics shouldn't be viewed as an unlikely system of rule.
It's no secret in post 2011 Egypt that the old regime powers continually aimed to prevent an environment that might weaken their authority. In creating bureaucratic impasses to hinder the reshaping of politics in favor of free elections continued to prevail. This is evident in the most dramatic and recent incidents of the sudden coup a month ago but also was apparent from the early days of attempting the transfer of power.
During the initial phase of implementing a post Mubarak government, many months passed before elections were held for nominating an interim parliament that could begin shifting authority from the Supreme Court of Armed Forces and the military elite. The mindset of the population seemed to mostly favor the prospects of an aptly organized political front consisting of many Muslim Brotherhood members among a collective of other party members who would fulfill their appointments based largely on regional ideologies.
According to a Nov. 29, 2011 article in the NY Times regarding the parliamentary first round voting, "The Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party claimed Wednesday that its running tally of votes put it ahead in all nine governorates that voted this week." It wasn't until January 21, 2012 that these Parliamentary elections were finalized. Forty-seven percent of the seats went to Freedom of Justice, 25% went to a more conservative, Islamist group, the Salafis, 30% to Wafdj, the former Mubarak, liberal party, and less than 10% went to Christian and pro-Business politicians.
For five months during the first half of 2012, this newly elected body assembled trying to pave a way for the presidential elections to take place. Other priorities included helping to form a constitutional body that could begin drafting a document shortly after the upcoming presidential elections. In simple terms, the controversy that most mired the situation just prior to the June, 2012 election was that of the military aligned court's continued interference with the momentum that was proving to be had by the popularly elected moderate, Islamist political movement.
In one of the most extreme examples of disruptive intervention against the election process was when the courts ordered the dissolution of Parliament and attempted a last minute ban on Morsi's candidacy. Parliament remained intact however and the election ensured Morsi's victory but this undoubtedly set a tone for the obstacles to be faced by the new government. From that point, the political objective involved creating a constitution, selecting members of cabinet and conducting legislation amongst the others participants of the infantile government.
Jumping now into the present, on July 3, Morsi was immediately forced to step down while being taken into custody during a coup orchestrated by the defense minister and former army general Abded Fattah el-Sisi. The group known as Tammarod was responsible and essentially is thought to be a front for the anti-Morsi members of Egypt's military who quickly joined together in weeks prior to the recent escalation of violence. The group voiced their mission across media outlets in the context of freeing the nation from it's conservative Islamist ties and implementing a free state in line what had been demanded during the rise of the Arab movement in Spring, 2011. Tammarod dispatched members of the police force to gun down opposition citizens that led to the death of seven hundred people during three days. Pro-Morsi supporters including the grandson of the founding Muslim Brotherhood leader accounted for the largest number of casualties over three violent days when shots were fired from outside of police stations into public gatherings of those who opposed the coup.
The timing of the situation doesn't entirely appear random as dissent for the last six months has ebbed with increased criticism being voiced that Morsi's government hasn't done enough to take charge of the country and implement the change that many had intended. The bureaucratic struggles which he has had to contend with largely seem to have precluded much democratic legitimacy from taking shape. Those who have voiced their criticism in the previous months are apt to take a stand against whomever they see as most culpable for failure to bring about the national reforms. And for many, the president has become the target of this dissatisfaction.
Further instigating the intensity of the opposing forces in Egypt was in late January as the process of finalizing the last members of Morsi's cabinet was being concluded. The leader choose to remove seven of the eighteen judicial figures from power as he was rightfully entitled to do. Yet the reaction from the judges was disdain which only further heightened the tense relations between the adversarial groups.
So the recent coup seems to be the result of a situation having primed itself among an increased disapproval of Morsi's presidency and an opposition force still powerful enough to rest authority back into their own hands. So whether Egypt is best kept in the hands of a newly configured state ruled by an aggressive group of dismissive reformists or if a brokered return of the elected Morsi government can reestablish itself is yet to be seen.